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NOTE AND COMMENT
PROHIBITING ADVERTISING ON WALLS AND BUILDINDS UNDER THE PoLIca
Powza. There have been many unsuccessful attempts by city authorities of
late to abolish or prevent unsightly billboards and advertising. In a recent
case A was arrested and fined for violating a city ordinance prohibiting the
display of advertising matter on walls and buildings within the city without
the consent of the city council. On refusal to pay the fine A was held in
the custody of the city marshal, and brought habeas corpus to secure his re-
lease. The court held that the affidavit charged no violation of the ordinance
unless it were construed as prohibiting the painting of any sign on walls or
buildings within the city, and the ordinance, if properly so construed, was
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invalid as constituting a taking of private property for public use without com-
pensation. Anderson v. Shackelford (Fla. 1917), 76 So. 343.
The court in this case refuses to extend the police power to prevent offenses
against public taste., In this it is in accord with the consensus of opinion as
evidenced by the decided cases, weakened by not a single dissent. Passaic v.
Paterson Bill Posting, &c. Co., 72 N. J. L. 285, 62 At!. 267; Bill Posting Sign
Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N. J. L. 72, 58 Atl. 342; City of Chicago v. Gunning
,Systelm, 214 Ill. 628, 73 N. E. 1o35; People v. City of Chicago, 261 Ill, 16,
io3 N. E. 6o0; People v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 17. In argument
against such limitation of the police power use has been made of the analogy
of billboards to smoke, noise and obnoxious odors, which may be prohibited
by ordinances enacted under the police power of a city. Rochester v. Macauley-
Fien Milling .Co., igg N. Y. 207, 92 N. E. 641; Glucose Refining Co. v. Chi-
cago, 138 Fed. 2o9; St. Paul v. Haugbro, 93 Minn. 59, ioo N. W. 47o (smoke);
Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 221; Grand Rapids v. Weiden, 97 Mich.
82, 56 N. W. 233 (obnoxious odors); Goodrich v. Buesse, 247 Ill. 366, 93 N. E.
292; New Orleans v. Fargot, 1i6 La. 370, 40 So. 735 (noises and unsightly
buildings and advertising signs); FRZUND, POLIcE PowR, sec. 182. There
are, however, two respects in which the analogy fails. First, all or nearly
all of the cases upholding ordinances enacted under the police power to
prohibit odors, noises and smoke, including those above cited, emphasize
the deleterious effect of such nuisances on the health of the community, and
there can be little doubt that these things cause actual physical discomfort
to those offended by them and are injurious to the general health of such
persons. Few, if any, esthetes who are offended by the sight of ugly signs
will attribute any real physical discomfort or injury to such unsightliness.
Second, the group of persons in any community who are offended by the
display of inartistic advertising matter is infinitely smaller than the group
of those who are offended by noise, bad odors and dense smoke,
The determination of the existence of a nuisance is made to depend upon
the presence of actual physical discomfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities,
McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., 140 Iowa 429, II8 N. W. 786; Wolcott v.
Doremus (1917), 101 Atl. 868, and the same test seems to have been uniform-
ly applied by the courts where an attempt has been made to prevent -the dis-
play of unsightly, but not immoral, advertising. The growth of civic pride
and the education of the masses in art coupled with a more general belief in
the intimate relation between mental contentment and physical wellbeing
may work the desired e, tension of the police power in the future to prevent
unsightly billboards and advertisements without abandonment of. this test.
The instant case must be distinguished from cases upholding ordinances
prohibiting the erection of billboards of a certain kind or in certain local-
ities on the ground that they tend to encourage crime, increase the fire haz-
ard and harbor nuisances dangerous to the public health. St. Louis Gun-
ning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929; Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 267
Ill. 344, io8 N. E. 340, affirmed, 242 U. S. 526. It must also be distinguished
HeinOnline  -- 16 Mich. L. Rev.  35 1917-1918
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
from cases declaring valid ordinances prohibiting "museums of anatomy,"
displaying models, pictures and charts of the human body, as the purpose of
such ordinances is clearly the protection of the public morals. Chicago v.
Shaynin, 258 Ill. 69, ioi N. E. 224. G. S.
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